Lecture #9: Pure exploration All previous Cectures: maximise cumulative reward -> exploration / exploitation trade-off In some applications, there is no price for exploring Think for example of a researcher testing drugs on mice / artificial human cells or testing products on some people before commercialitation. Share semilarities with regret minimisation, but good algorithms are actually different Setting (simple regret). We explore for Trounds At each round t=1,...,T: -polls an orm at EEK and commit to best action at time T+1. - observes Xat (+) ~ Vat (2) Goal : minimise simple regret $R_{r}^{\bullet \bullet r} = E \left[\mu^{\bullet} - \mu_{a_{r+1}} \right]$

Algorithm: Uniform exploration For t=1, ..., T: Choose at = 1+ (t mod k) $f_{T+1} \in \underset{k}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \mu_{k}(T).$ Theorem : Uniform-Exploration satisfies for any $v \in P([0, \underline{1}])$ $R_{T}^{ainple} \leq \frac{Z}{k} \Delta_{k} \exp\left(-2 \left[\frac{T}{k}\right] \Delta_{k}^{2}\right)$ Proof Let bouch that $D_k > 0$. $P\left(\hat{\mu}_{k}(\tau) \leq \hat{\mu}_{k}(\tau)\right) = iP\left(\hat{\mu}_{k}(\tau) - \hat{\mu}_{k}(\tau) \leq 0\right)$ Nao(T) and Na(T) are not random. We can directly apply Hoeffding inequality > [F] $IP(\hat{\mu}_{\mathcal{C}}(\tau) \leq \hat{\mu}_{\mathcal{A}}(\tau)) \leq \exp\left(-2(N_{\mathcal{L}}(\tau) \cdot N_{\mathcal{C}}(\tau))\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}^{2}\right)$ $\leq \exp\left(-2\left[\frac{1}{K}\right]\Delta_{k}^{2}\right)$ $R_{T}^{sinple} = \sum_{k, \Delta_{k} > 0} \Delta_{k} P(a_{T+1} = k)$ $\underbrace{Z}_{k,\Delta_{n,70}} \Delta_k P(\hat{\mu}_{k^{\bullet}}(\tau) \leq \hat{\mu}_{k}(\tau))$ $\left\{ \sum_{\substack{k,\Delta_{k}>0}} \Delta_{k} \exp\left(-2\left[\frac{1}{K}\right]\Delta_{k}^{2}\right) \right\}$

Therem UE, distribution free bound frog v E ADD^K, R The S Z V K (en (K) v 1) P160 Actually, we could have written for any $\widetilde{\Delta} \ge 0$ $R_{\tau}^{sinple} \leq \tilde{\Delta} + \sum_{k, k \neq \tilde{\lambda}} \Delta_{k} |P(a_{\tau+1} = k)$ $\langle \tilde{\Delta} + K\tilde{\Delta} \exp(-2L\tilde{E}]\tilde{\Delta}^2)$ for any \$30 Taking $\widetilde{\Delta} = \sqrt{\frac{\ln(\mathbf{K})_{v1}}{2 |T/v|}}$, we have: $R_{4}^{sniple} \ll \widetilde{O} + \widetilde{O} \times e^{-(ln\kappa)\kappa d} \ll 2\widetilde{O}$ < Z log K vs if T& 2K, Romph & 1 and the bound holds. 设T32K, 長为玉 $R_{T} \lesssim Z | \frac{K(R_{1}(K)v1)}{T}$ D

(see evenine (s can we do better than UE? i.e.get rid of VlnK term. Reduction from cumulative regret. For any stratagy (TTF) tes,...,T , we can define TT o.t. $\widetilde{\Pi}_{F} = \Pi_{F} \quad fer \quad F = \Delta_{J} = T$ $\Re_{\widetilde{T}} \left(a_{T+1} = k \mid F_{T} \right) = \frac{N_{e}(T)}{T}$ **Proposition** for any instance v, $R_{\tau}^{\text{subple}}(v,\tilde{\pi}) = \frac{R_{\tau}(v,\tilde{\pi})}{T}$. $\frac{P_{nool}}{R_{T}^{oinpl}}\left(\nu,\widetilde{T}\right) = \sum_{\substack{k=1\\k=1}}^{k} P_{\widetilde{T}}\left(a_{T+1}=k\right) \Delta_{k}$ $= \frac{\sum_{k=2}^{K} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{P}_{\widehat{T}}(a_{T+1} = k) \cdot \mathcal{F}_{\widehat{T}} \right] \Delta_{k}}{T} = \frac{1}{T} \frac{\sum_{k=2}^{K} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{N}_{k}(T) \right]}{T} = \frac{\mathbb{R}_{T}(\nu, T)}{T}$ Corollary: there exists a strategy with a simple regret $\mathcal{R}_{T}^{ijk} \ll C \int_{T}^{K} \int_{D} a minimal world <math>\mathbf{c}$. (Relarge HOS with $\widetilde{\mathbf{n}}$)

Best arm identification Setting 1: (fixed confidence) At each nound t= 1, ..., po: (bried on previous observations) - agent picks an arm at ECK] - observes Xay (+) ~ var (-) - decides whether to continue compling on stop. new If stop: return afind choice YGEK] The (nondom) stopping time is called t 1) Have a sound strategy: $P(\tau < \infty \text{ and } \mu_{\psi} < \mu^{\bullet}) < \overline{\tau} \quad (f^{n} and)$ Goal 2) Minimye the exploration time E[T] Our algorithm will be built on the following lower bound Theorem (lowa bound) Let (TT, T, T) be a sound stratigy for the bandit model D, with confidence level 56(1) and let vED^K. Then; $E[T] > c^{*}(v) ln\left(\frac{1}{45}\right)$ where $C^{\bullet}(\gamma)^{-2} = \sup_{\substack{\alpha \in \mathcal{P}_{k}}} \left(\inf_{\substack{\nu' \in \mathcal{O}_{alt}(\nu)}}^{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_{k} K L(\gamma_{k}, \nu'_{k}) \right)$ i. e ho ann is where $\mathcal{D}_{olf}(v) = \left\{ v' \in \mathcal{D}^{k} \mid \operatorname{argmax} \mathbb{E}(v_{k}) \land \operatorname{argmax} \mathbb{E}[v_{k}'] = \phi \right\}$ optimal for both rand v'

Another use of fundamental inequality (with stopping time) Lemma; (admitted) For all bandit publics $v = (v_R)_{L(G)}$ and $v' = (v'_R)_{R\in G}$ in \mathcal{D}^K with $v_R \ll p$ all hfor all strategies TT, pay stopping time T with respect to the filtration (T(H+)) ondany random vanishe Z taking values in [0,1], $\tau(H_z)$ -moosurable, $\overline{\sigma(H_{\tau})} = \left| A \in \overline{\sigma(H_{\infty})} \right| A \cap \left\{ T \leq t \right\} \in \overline{\sigma(H_{t})} \int_{t}^{t} dt$ $\sum_{k=1}^{n} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{F}}[N_{k}(\tau)] \operatorname{KL}(\mathcal{H}_{k}, \mathcal{V}_{k}') \geq \operatorname{KL}(\operatorname{Bu}(\mathbb{E}_{v}[\mathbb{Z}]), \operatorname{Bu}(\mathbb{E}_{v'}[\mathbb{Z}]))$ hoof of the Theorem Assum E[T] < 00 (otherwise the result holds), so that P(T= 00) = 0 Let $v' \in \mathfrak{I}_{aet}(v)$. We define the $\mathcal{J}(H_{\tau})$ -massinable n.v $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{I}_{\{\tau < \infty \text{ and } \psi \notin argmax \mathbb{E}(\nu_{k})\}}$. Then the fundamental inequality (with stopping time) yields: $\sum_{k=1}^{k} E_{\gamma}[M_{k}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{k}, \nu_{k}') > KL(B_{n}(E_{\nu}[z]), B_{n}(E_{\nu'}[z]))$ $= \sum_{k=1}^{n} E_{\gamma}[M_{k}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{k}, \nu_{k}') > KL(B_{n}(E_{\nu}[z]), B_{n}(E_{\nu'}[z]))$ confidence level 5 $\sum \left(\overline{1-2}\right) \ln \left(\frac{2}{\overline{1-2}}\right) + 2 \ln \left(\frac{7-2}{2}\right).$

$$= (447) \ln \left(\frac{4-7}{2}\right) \ge \ln(4)$$

$$= t.47) \ln \left(\frac{4}{2}\right) = \ln(4)$$

$$= t.47) \ln \left(\frac{4}{2}\right) = \ln(4)$$

$$= t.47 + t.47 + t.47 + t.77 + t.77 + t.47 + t$$

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$$\begin{split} &\lim_{\delta \to 0} \frac{\mathbb{E}[T_{\lambda}]}{\mathbb{E}[Y_{\lambda}]} = \mathbb{C}^{2}(v) \\ & \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}]}{\mathbb{E}[Y_{\lambda}]} = \mathbb{C}^{2}(v) \\ & \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}]}{\mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}]} = \mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}] + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}] + \mathbb{E}[W_{\lambda}]$$

-, much house problem